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The outbreak of inﬂ   uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
prompted many countries in Asia, previously strongly af-
fected by severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), to 
respond with stringent measures, particularly in preventing 
outbreaks in hospitals. We studied actual direct costs and 
cost-effectiveness of different response measures from a 
hospital perspective in tertiary hospitals in Singapore by 
simulating outbreaks of SARS, pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 
and 1918 Spanish inﬂ  uenza. Protection measures target-
ing only infected patients yielded lowest incremental cost/
death averted of $23,000 (US$) for pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 
Enforced protection in high-risk areas (Yellow Alert) and full 
protection throughout the hospital (Orange Alert) averted 
deaths but came at an incremental cost of up to $2.5 million/
death averted. SARS and Spanish inﬂ  uenza favored more 
stringent measures. High case-fatality rates, virulence, and 
high proportion of atypical manifestations impacted cost-ef-
fectiveness the most. A calibrated approach in accordance 
with viral characteristics and community risks may help re-
ﬁ  ne responses to future epidemics.
P
andemic inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus is a new in-
ﬂ  uenza virus of swine origin that was ﬁ  rst detected in 
April 2009. Within 4 months of its appearance in Mexico, 
it had spread to >100 countries, with >200,000 conﬁ  rmed 
cases globally, including >2,000 deaths (1). When the 
World Health Organization (WHO) raised its global inﬂ  u-
enza pandemic alert to phase 5 (imminent pandemic) on 
April 27, 2009, many countries followed suit and activated 
their pandemic preparedness plans, although this varied be-
tween countries. Many countries with direct experience of 
the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) out-
break tended toward more stringent measures.
Singapore was one of the countries most affected by 
SARS and experienced a disproportionate impact of the 
spread of the disease in hospitals (2,3). A total of 98 health-
care workers in Singapore were infected with SARS, 6 of 
whom died (4). After the SARS experience, Singapore’s 
Ministry of Health (MOH) developed a pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
plan with several levels of response that correlated roughly 
with the WHO Pandemic Alert Response system (5). The 
Disease Outbreak Response System (DORSCON)-FLU 
system that MOH devised requires progressively higher 
levels of infection control in hospitals in addition to bor-
der screening, restrictions on visitors to hospitals, and 
community-based syndromic surveillance for acute febrile 
illnesses (Table 1).
In accordance with the progressive elevation of WHO 
pandemic alert levels, Singapore raised its own pandemic 
alert level to Yellow on April 27, 2009, and further elevat-
ed it to Orange 2 days later. At this level, all hospital staff 
were required to wear N95 masks when dealing with all pa-
tients. Patients were restricted to 1 registered and screened 
visitor, all medical and nursing student rotations and lo-
cal medical conferences were cancelled, leave restrictions 
for healthcare workers (HCWs) were put in place, inter-
hospital movement of patients and HCWs was banned, and 
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further limitations were placed on elective surgery. These 
measures were aimed primarily at avoiding a repeat of the 
SARS epidemic where nosocomial transmission originated 
with patients whose SARS infections were undiagnosed in 
hospital, and because inﬂ  uenza may be contagious before 
symptoms develop in infected patients. In fact, nosocomial 
inﬂ  uenza has been well documented since the 1957 Asian 
inﬂ  uenza pandemic (6). Based on studies conducted pri-
marily in the United States, it has been estimated that 1 
nosocomial case of inﬂ  uenza in a pediatric unit can cost up 
to $7,500 (US) (7). A recent review (8) of 28 nosocomial 
outbreaks of seasonal inﬂ  uenza summarized the evidence 
for nosocomial transmission of inﬂ  uenza in hospitals with 
accompanying illness and death (8,9).
When it subsequently became apparent that the case-
fatality rate for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was much lower 
than previously thought, especially in settings of industrial-
ized countries, the alert level in Singapore was lowered to 
Yellow on May 11, 2009, even as WHO moved to alert 
level 6 after the pandemic was declared.
The risks and impacts of an outbreak will no doubt de-
pend on the transmissibility, virulence, and clinical severity 
of illness. Thus, the beneﬁ  ts of a high alert status response 
at the onset of an outbreak as a “safe rather than sorry” 
strategy is not unreasonable when faced with an unknown 
novel potentially lethal virus. Yet, on the other hand, pre-
ventive measures from a hospital perspective come with a 
price. Direct costs include activation as well as ongoing ad-
ministrative, manpower, and logistic resources, such as use 
of enhanced personal protective equipment, as part of the 
alert response measures.
We made use of this unique opportunity to evaluate 
the real costs of our primary prevention interventions and 
their potential cost-effectiveness against different models 
of inﬂ  uenza virulence and transmissibility in a simulated 
outbreak in our 1,000-bed tertiary teaching hospital to un-
derstand the relative incremental cost per additional death 
averted at different alert status levels. The key variables 
that affected the cost-effectiveness ratio the most were 
identiﬁ  ed and studied. The same analysis was subsequently 
repeated for a parallel 1,500-bed tertiary teaching hospi-
tal. Using the outcome variables of disease cases, deaths, 
and incremental cost per death averted, we sought to deter-
mine if a calibrated and measured response plan based on 
characteristics of the virus in the outbreak could be better 
deﬁ  ned.
Methods
To determine the cost incurred per day over the period 
where hospitals were at DORSCON Yellow and Orange, 
we obtained actual direct and indirect costs from the Op-
erations and Finance Departments of the hospitals. Excess 
costs were measured by comparing these with operating 
costs and results over the same period in 2008.
To simulate a hospital outbreak, we used a decision 
analysis model to perform cost-effectiveness analysis to 
determine the impact of an outbreak from a single index 
case that was not detected by hospital surveillance and was 
found in the general ward. The Markov decision model was 
built using Treeage software (www.treeage.com), and sim-
ulation was performed based on hospital staff and inpatients 
(n = 7,500) over a time horizon of 30 days. Each person 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Singapore MOH influenza outbreak response system* 
Singapore MOH 
DORSCON alert 
level
WHO 
pandemic
alert level  Global/local situation  Hospital measures Community measures 
Green 0  1 No novel influenza virus 
circulating
Triage and isolation of febrile 
patients, use of PPE as 
appropriate 
Surveillance, maintenance of 
antiviral drug stockpile 
Green 1  2–3 Novel virus but predominantly 
animal disease with limited 
transmission to humans 
Full PPE for suspect cases, 
contact tracing for confirmed 
cases, antiviral treatment for all 
confirmed cases 
Enhanced surveillance, 
communication, readiness 
measures
Yellow 4 Inefficient human-to-human 
transmission of novel virus 
Full PPE for HCWs in high risk 
contact, visitor restriction, 
restrict movement of patients 
and HCWs 
Enhanced surveillance, public 
health education, border body 
temperature screening, 
surveillance of returned travelers 
from affected areas 
Orange  5 Global or local clusters but 
transmission still localized 
PPE stepped up to cover 
“medium-risk” patients, no 
visitors, no interhospital 
movement of patients or HCWs, 
post-exposure prophylaxis for 
contacts
Body temperature screening at 
community areas, consider school 
closure, body temperature 
screening at borders, enhanced 
public health education 
Red 6 Pandemic under way, import 
into Singapore is inevitable 
As above with establishment of 
18 influenza clinics 
As above with possible use of 
masks in the community 
*MOH, Ministry of Health; DORSCON, Disease Outbreak Response System; WHO, World Health Organization; PPE, personal protective equipment;
HCWs, healthcare workers. Adapted from (5).  Infection Control Response to Epidemic Respiratory Virus
would transit between exclusive Markov states of Suscep-
tible, Exposed, Incubation, Infectious, Isolated, Atypical, 
Recovered, or Dead. (Figure 1). The scenario assumes that 
all clinical cases will be identiﬁ  ed and isolated. Infection 
is thus transmitted in the preclinical infectious phase or by 
atypical or subclinical cases not recognized and hence not 
isolated, as well as through the failure of personal protec-
tive equipment. Variables studied in the model included the 
number of persons exposed per infected patient, secondary 
attack rate, percentage of atypical and subclinical cases, 
duration of preclinical infectious period, and infectious pe-
riod, as well as case-fatality rate.
Based on preliminary data available at the time of writ-
ing, comparisons were made between 3 respiratory viruses: 
a SARS-like virus, a 1918 Spanish inﬂ  uenza–like virus, 
and a pandemic (H1N1) 2009–type virus. Validation of the 
model was performed by comparing generated reproduc-
tion numbers to reported estimates from actual SARS data 
in Singapore (10) and Spanish inﬂ  uenza (for conﬁ  ned ar-
eas) (11) and showed consistent case and death numbers. 
We compared 4 different strategies: 1) no additional mea-
sures; 2) Green Alert response, which mandated personal 
protective equipment (PPE) for HCWs in direct contact 
with patients suspected of having avian inﬂ  uenza or other 
emerging infectious diseases; 3) Yellow Alert response, 
which mandated enhanced PPE at all high-risk areas; and 
4) Orange Alert response, which mandated N95 masks 
for all patient contact and the restrictions described above 
(Table 1). Outcome measures were number of patients in-
fected, number of deaths, cost (in US$) per case prevented, 
and cost per death prevented compared to baseline where 
no preventive measures were implemented, as well as in-
cremental cost per death averted compared with the corre-
sponding lower level of alert status. Multivariate sensitivity 
analysis was performed to understand the impact of viral 
characteristics as well as different hospital response poli-
cies on cost-effectiveness outcomes. The number of persons 
exposed in hospital and protective gear failure rates were 
from an actual outbreak simulation exercise performed at 
our hospital (12). Because there were no cases of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus infections during this period, estimates 
were all based on those in the literature (13). Details of the 
input variables are included in Table 2.
Results
An outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 from intro-
duction by an HCW, a patient with undiagnosed infection, 
or a visitor in our hospital at base case with no protection 
measures will result in 2,580 infected patients at 30 days. 
This ﬁ  nding would be similar to that of seasonal inﬂ  uenza 
and correspond to a 30% attack rate. With a 0.4% mortality 
rate, there would be 10 deaths from infection with pandem-
ic (H1N1) 2009 virus. In contrast, Spanish inﬂ  uenza would 
result in 3,210 infected patients and 161 deaths (case-fa-
tality rate 5%). The increased number of infections in the 
Spanish inﬂ  uenza model is driven by the short incubation 
time of the epidemic and results in more rounds of infection 
rather than an increase in basic reproductive number (aver-
age number of secondary cases per index case) (14). On the 
other hand, because SARS has a longer incubation period 
and lower transmissibility rate, the number of infected pa-
tients is lower at 825 but, owing to the high case-fatality 
rates, 82 deaths may ensue (Table 3).
Green Alert status mandates PPE for HCWs in direct 
contact with patients suspected of having the infection. 
Transmission will thus be only through preclinical cases 
before they are identiﬁ  ed and patients can be isolated or 
through atypical or subclinical cases that are missed. We 
assumed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 has a lowered 50% trans-
missibility for atypical or subclinical cases (15); this rate 
effectively reduced the infected patients to 316 with only 
1 death (Figure 2, panel B). This resulted in additional 
costs of $95 to prevent 1 additional infected patient and 
$23,600 to prevent 1 death. Moving to Yellow Alert would 
reduce infected patients to 59 and avert all deaths. The 
costs to prevent additional infection and death are $3,221 
and $828,000, respectively. Activating Orange alert with 
full PPE gear, restricting visitors, and cancelling elective 
procedures would halve the infections to only 24 cases 
with no deaths. However, the additional cost over Yellow 
Alert would escalate to $7,153 per infection prevented and 
a staggering $2.5 million to inﬁ  nity for 1 death averted 
(Figure 3).
Simulation for Spanish inﬂ  uenza showed a decreased 
number of deaths from 31 at Green Alert to 6 at Yellow 
Alert and 3 at Orange Alert (Figure 2, panel B). This ﬁ  nd-
ing translated to $50,000 per death averted moving from 
Green to Yellow and $153,000 per death averted moving 
from Yellow Alert to Orange. For SARS, on the other hand, 
the incremental cost of moving from Green Alert to Yellow 
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 15, No. 12, December 2009  1911 
Figure 1. Markov model simulating a stochastic simulation of 
epidemics approach for an outbreak in a hospital institution.RESEARCH
is $120,000 per death averted; this drops to $75,000 when 
moving from Yellow to Orange. This ﬁ  nding is mainly due 
to the high (10%) case-fatality rate and the relatively higher 
percentage of atypical patients who are missed and not iso-
lated, a lesson learned from the actual SARS experience 
(Figure 3).
Sensitivity analysis showed that the factors that im-
pacted the cost-effectiveness ratio most are case-fatality 
rate, patient exposure rate, and secondary attack rate 
(Figure 4). In the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 scenario, the case 
fatality-rate ranging from 0.1% (seasonal inﬂ  uenza) to 10% 
(SARS) results in the cost per death averted moving from 
inﬁ  nity (no death) to $35,000 per death averted (Orange 
Alert). Similarly, changing the exposure rate from 1.5 per-
sons/day (10% PPE failure rate, Orange Alert) to 30 per-
sons/day (0% reduction) per infected patient changed the 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio from $2.5 million per 
death averted to $23,000. If pandemic (H1N1) 2009 had a 
higher 50% transmission rate, Orange Alert would become 
the most cost-effective strategy. The other variables had an 
impact on cost per case prevented but did not impact the 
incremental cost per death averted ratio.
To determine the impact of hospital size on our model, 
we modeled our simulation on the nation’s other tertiary 
hospital with 1,500 beds using their actual cost records. The 
model estimates that 10 expected deaths in the outbreak 
would be reduced to 1 death under Green Alert and none 
in Yellow and Orange Alerts. The incremental cost/death 
averted is $32,000, $1.9 million, and $5.4 million when 
moving from Green to Yellow to Orange, respectively. Al-
though the cost ranking is consistent with that predicted by 
base-case simulation, the actual incremental cost index is 
much higher, reﬂ  ecting the higher cost for activating alert 
status in a bigger hospital.
Discussion
Singapore and many of the other countries badly affect-
ed by the SARS epidemic of 2003 launched comprehensive 
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Table 2. Variables used in Markov mode (base case and sensitivity analysis) to compare outbreak estimates, Singapore* 
Variable Description Base case  Sensitivity analysis 
Exposure No. persons exposed in 1 day in 
hospital per index case (nonlinear) 
15 (average for 2 days) 
6 (average for 5 days) 
2–30
Secondary attack rate  No. persons exposed/infected  30% Spanish influenza 
10% SARS 
30% pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
10–100%
Incubation period  Time to symptoms  Spanish influenza: 2 days 
SARS: 4 day 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009: 3 days 
1–7
Infectious period preclinical  Incubation–latent  Spanish influenza: 1 day 
SARS: 0 day 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009: 1 day 
1–3
% Clinical versus asymptomatic  Spanish influenza: 95% 
SARS: 100% 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009: 95% 
70–100%
% Atypical (missed)  Spanish influenza: 5% 
SARS: 20% 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009: 5% 
0–50%
% Complication  10× mortality rate 
Infective atypical  Infective 4 days  1–7
Case-fatality rate  % death  Spanish influenza: 5% 
SARS: 10% 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009: 4% 
Isolation failure  Transmission despite PPE/isolation  5% 0–10%
Exposure reduction  % reduction in exposure rate  Alert Green 50% 
Alert Yellow 80% 
Alert Orange 90% 
0–100%
Cost based on alert policy, direct 
and indirect 
Once 
Daily recurring 
Activation: US$110,000 
Green: US$4,000 
Yellow: US$76,000 
Orange: US$100,000 
Cost by type of treatment, based 
on actual financial charges 
Isolation
Treatment antiviral/day 
Uncomplicated influenza 
Complicated influenza 
Respiratory failure with mechanical 
ventilation
US$230
US$25
Mean: US$600, Median: US$420 
Mean: US$1800, Median: US$220 
Mean: US$5,500, Median:US$4,660 
*SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; PPE, personal protective equipment.  Infection Control Response to Epidemic Respiratory Virus
pandemic response plans based on a SARS model (5). The 
lessons of the SARS epidemic, in particular the effect of 
protecting HCWs from patients with undiagnosed, uniso-
lated respiratory viral infections (16,17), have been applied 
rigorously to the pandemic plans of the Singapore Ministry 
of Health. Although it is difﬁ  cult to quantify the impact of 
these interventions when they are taken as a whole, data 
from our modeling show that a nuanced approach that con-
centrates on administrative measures to isolate patients and 
selectively use PPE when working with patients suspected 
of having novel strains of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
would have a relatively favorable cost-effectiveness ratio.
On the other hand, the psychological and economic 
impact of SARS has been described as one of Singapore’s 
most traumatic experiences and one that left deep scars on 
the healthcare system of this country (18). It could be and 
has been argued that a draconian approach that seeks to pro-
tect all HCWs fully ensures that every case of inﬂ  uenza is 
identiﬁ  ed early and contacts traced. Any healthcare facility 
ensuring no second- or third-generation transmission would 
provide intangible gains that exceed the economic costs of 
such a strategy. Nevertheless, this desire must still be bal-
anced against the community impact of a disease such as 
inﬂ  uenza, which has a different epidemiology than SARS 
(7). We currently believe that pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vi-
rus causes predominantly community-based disease (13). 
Data from the United States, where infection control rec-
ommendations (19) are similar to our DORSCON Green, 
have not shown any evidence to date of large nosocomial 
outbreaks.
In our model, we have shown that cost-effectiveness 
ratio is dependent on the interplay between exposure rate, 
transmissibility (secondary attack rate), case-fatality rate, 
and risk of transmission from atypical cases. Infectious dis-
eases with high fatality rates and transmission from atypi-
cal cases (such as SARS) will need the full beneﬁ  t of PPE 
to reduce mortality rates. This ﬁ  nding is reﬂ  ected in Orange 
Alert having a better cost-effectiveness ratio than Yellow 
Alert. Mild diseases with low fatality rates, such as pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009, and low incidence of atypical or sub-
clinical infectious cases have the best cost-effectiveness ra-
tio at Green Alert provided surveillance measures are able 
to identify infected patients and isolate them early. The 
cost-effectiveness ratio increases exponentially after that 
due to the much higher costs incurred. However, although 
Yellow Alert comes at a heavier price tag, it effectively 
averts any deaths. Activating Orange Alert increases cost 
with minimal beneﬁ  t in mortality rate reduction. In reality, 
our model suggests that parallel efforts in contact tracing 
and voluntary quarantine may further reduce the exposure 
rate and break the chain of transmission.
Our base model took into account only direct costs as-
sociated with each alert status. In real situations, indirect 
costs such as lost revenues from cancellation of elective 
surgeries to free up hospital resources, decreased elec-
tive admissions and outpatient attendances, administrative 
costs associated with senior staff meetings, and lost clini-
cal teaching time, add up to more than the direct costs and 
would magnify the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio fur-
ther. In fact, if direct and indirect costs were included in 
the modeling, the incremental cost/death averted ratio of 
moving from Yellow Alert to Orange in pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 increased to a staggering $8–$81 million for both 
hospitals. Although these indirect costs are not part of the 
infection control process per se, surge capacity response 
plans to ensure that the healthcare system has the reserve 
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Table 3. Results of cost-effectiveness analysis of potential outbreaks and responses, Singapore* 
Alert level and disease
No.
infected No. deaths 
Additional
cost
Cost/case
prevented†
Cost/death
prevented†
Incremental
cost/case‡
Incremental
cost/death‡
None
  Pandemic (H1N1) 2009   2,580 10 25,200
 Spanish  influenza  3,210 161 80,000
 SARS  825 83 99,200
Green 
  Pandemic (H1N1) 2009  316 1 326,430 95 23,644
 Spanish  influenza  624 31 468,000 107 2,140
 SARS  105 11 220,500 120 1,195
Yellow 
  Pandemic (H1N1) 2009  59 0.2 1,485,500 414 103,274 3,221 827,907
 Spanish  influenza  120 6 2,212,000 493 9,857 2,472 49,829
 SARS  43 4 1,188,000 995 9,945 11,146 121,241
Orange 
  Pandemic (H1N1) 2009  24 0.1 1,836,000 506 126,807 7,153 2,503,600
 Spanish  influenza  59 2.95 2,856,000 629 12,590 7,541 153,333
 SARS  12 1.2 1,537,000 1,263 12,601 8,041 7,541
*SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. All costs given in US$. 
†Compared with no policy. 
‡Compared with 1 alert level down. RESEARCH
capacity to react to a full-blown community outbreak are 
critical to all pandemic plans (20) and contribute serious 
costs to the hospital.
The major limitations of our study are that we have sim-
ulated a situation in which community infection is still rela-
tively low and the outbreak in hospital arises from 1 index 
case. When a community epidemic is established, the inci-
dence of new index cases entering the institution increases, 
especially if there are prevalent atypical or subclinically 
infected persons. In such a scenario the cost-effectiveness 
ratio of higher alert status will decrease, and it may become 
more beneﬁ  cial to escalate protective measures.
Cost-effectiveness analyses merely provide a math-
ematical projection to better understand the key factors that 
affect outcomes. The actual magnitude of the cost-effec-
tiveness will vary depending on institutional cost, which 
varies between different sized hospitals and whether direct 
or indirect costs are included. Nonetheless, knowledge of 
the exponential relationship of the different viruses on the 
cost-effectiveness ranking is critical in charting response 
policy. Indirect costs of an uncontrolled pandemic are also 
economic and social, especially in Singapore where the 
economy is dependent on trade and tourism. A higher cost-
effectiveness ratio does not imply that additional lives are 
not worth saving. In the case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 
if it costs $2.5 million to prevent 1 death, using a median 
age of 37 years for persons who died (21) and expected 
life expectancy of 80 years (22), the incremental cost-ef-
fectiveness ratio works out to $40,000 per life-year saved. 
In addition, preventive measures go beyond saving lives 
and include resultant savings from reducing hospitaliza-
tion of infected patients and prolonged intensive care with 
mechanical ventilation for severe cases, as well as the 
logistic costs of further contact tracing and quarantine. 
We have not factored the cost of inﬂ  uenza antiviral 
prophylaxis or the costs and effectiveness of novel vaccina-
tions that may be required, nor did we include the costs of 
work-days lost from staff taking medical leave due to their 
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Figure 2. Epidemic simulation. A) Base case simulation assuming 
no protection over 30 days (n = 7,500). B) Number of deaths for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Spanish inﬂ   uenza, and severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) with different levels of alert status.
Figure 3. Incremental cost/death for 3 viruses with different alert 
status. Incremental cost to avert 1 additional death moving through 
ascending levels of alert status. Cost-effectiveness increases 
exponentially for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 while maintaining an 
almost linear fashion for both Spanish inﬂ  uenza and severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS). The incremental cost/death averted 
ratio is lower for Alert Orange compared to Alert Yellow for SARS. Infection Control Response to Epidemic Respiratory Virus
being infected or being placed in quarantine. The impact of 
lax border controls, subclinical patients carrying the virus 
into the community, and closure of community institutions 
or even hospitals due to an outbreak were also not com-
puted. We assumed that the hospital is a closed community 
with a ﬁ  xed number of staff and patients. This obviously is 
not true in real life but is mitigated in our analysis because 
the same assumption is applied to every response measure 
and the outcomes are incremental indices over another lev-
el of protection.
From the perspective of a healthcare institution, how 
do we predict the virulence of new virus early in the out-
break and adopt the most cost-effective response policy? If 
a mild epidemic spreads rapidly through the community, 
there might be multiple points of entry into the hospital; 
however, such a mild community outbreak might present 
more commonly to primary healthcare clinics and presenta-
tions to hospital may be few. Thus a step-up approach from 
Green to Yellow in accordance with predicted risks as we 
have shown may be the most cost-effective approach.
It is not known for certain how pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
will behave in subsequent waves. Although the new virus 
seems to have relatively low virulence, the virus might re-
emerge with a case-fatality rate more like that of the 1918 
inﬂ  uenza pandemic or the SARS pandemic. Our model 
shows that DORSCON Green, which focuses on infection 
control for suspected cases, will achieve a relatively high 
degree of protection for our staff, patients, and visitors 
even in the setting of a higher case-fatality rate. The main 
advantage of DORSCON Yellow and Orange is that unde-
tected infected persons that are not isolated are less likely 
to become a source of transmission if there is universal use 
of N95 masks. This has to be balanced with the degree of 
compliance that can be achieved by the use of full-scale 
PPE for patients with no risk of the disease (e.g., patients 
with trauma or other medical or surgical conditions) and 
the well known adverse effects of prolonged use of N95 
masks (23).
However, it is useful to also note that although a step-
up approach may be the most cost-effective for the health-
care institution, the appropriate policy stance at the national 
level may not necessarily be the same. Our model did not 
take into account the psychological and economic impact 
to the country and the larger healthcare system, which are 
serious factors to consider when making a policy decision 
on the appropriate response across the healthcare system. 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and China were among the settings 
most severely affected by the SARS outbreak in 2003. In 
the initial face of an unknown virus with a perceived high 
mortality rate in Mexico, Singapore’s response to ﬁ  rst err 
on the side of safety and make adjustments dynamically as 
the situation became clearer therefore would be reasonable 
when viewed from the larger perspective.
Such actions, however, were not without their own ad-
verse effects in terms of cost and in overall patient care at 
the healthcare institution. We had the opportunity to per-
form a cost-effectiveness analysis using the actual costs 
incurred from this heightened infection control response. 
We have quantiﬁ  ed how the virulence or case-fatality rate 
of a respiratory viral infection has a serious impact on the 
hospital infection control response. This impact occurs at 2 
levels, ﬁ  rst, the actual number of deaths and ill persons, and 
second, the direct and indirect costs on the hospital in terms 
of activation, logistics, and lost revenue. This impact is re-
ﬂ  ected in the subsequent responses of Singapore and other 
countries when the virulence of the novel inﬂ  uenza virus 
appeared to be much less than previously feared. Under-
standing the key factors that affect the cost-effectiveness 
ratio will enable us to make better informed decisions as we 
prepare to respond to future epidemics.
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